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abstract: Inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism are widely
thought to be distinct explanations for how altruism evolves. Here
we show that they rely on the same underlying mechanism. We
demonstrate this commonality by applying Hamilton’s rule, normally
associated with inclusive fitness, to two simple models of reciprocal
altruism: one, an iterated prisoner’s dilemma model with conditional
behavior; the other, a mutualistic symbiosis model where two inter-
acting species differ in conditional behaviors, fitness benefits, and
costs. We employ Queller’s generalization of Hamilton’s rule because
the traditional version of this rule does not apply when genotype
and phenotype frequencies differ or when fitness effects are non-
additive, both of which are true in classic models of reciprocal al-
truism. Queller’s equation is more general in that it applies to all
situations covered by earlier versions of Hamilton’s rule but also
handles nonadditivity, conditional behavior, and lack of genetic sim-
ilarity between altruists and recipients. Our results suggest changes
to standard interpretations of Hamilton’s rule that focus on kinship
and indirect fitness. Despite being more than 20 years old, Queller’s
generalization of Hamilton’s rule is not sufficiently appreciated, es-
pecially its implications for the unification of the theories of inclusive
fitness and reciprocal altruism.
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dilemma, kin selection, mutualism, synergy.
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More than 40 years ago, Hamilton developed an expla-
nation for the evolution of altruism among relatives based
on the idea of inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1963, 1964, 1970,
1972, 1975). His most famous result, known as Hamilton’s
rule (HR), is usually interpreted as specifying the condi-
tions under which the indirect fitness of altruists (due to
helping relatives have more offspring) sufficiently coun-
terbalances the immediate self-sacrifice of altruists. In this
way, the altruistic trait can increase overall. This mecha-
nism is also known as kin selection (Maynard Smith 1964).
Twenty-five years ago, Axelrod and Hamilton (1981)
launched a still vigorous area of research (for reviews, see
Dugatkin 1997; Sachs et al. 2004; Doebeli and Hauert
2005) in which computer-based models of the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) are used to study the evolution
of cooperation via reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971). In
their article, Axelrod and Hamilton suggest that there are
these two alternative explanations for the evolution of co-
operative traits: when the benefits of altruism fall to rel-
atives, cooperation can evolve by inclusive fitness, and
when benefits fall to nonrelatives, cooperation can evolve
by reciprocal altruism.1 A third theory for the evolution
of altruism, based on multilevel (or group) selection (Wil-
son 1975; Wade 1978), is not addressed directly by Axelrod
and Hamilton (or in this article), but several researchers
have demonstrated the underlying unity between inclusive
fitness and multilevel selection theories (Wade 1980; Bre-
den 1990; Queller 1992b; Frank 1998; Sober and Wilson
1998). For reasons discussed below, reciprocal altruism is
often left out of these unification efforts. Here we focus
on this missing piece: the unification of the theories of
inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.
It is understandable that Axelrod and Hamilton (1981)
do not suggest that HR could apply to reciprocal altruism
and their IPD models. In addition to assuming that players
are unrelated, these models involve conditional strategies
(genotype/phenotype differences) and nonadditive fitness
1 We use cooperation and altruism synonymously because cooperation in our
models involves an immediate altruistic sacrifice in fitness that provides rel-
ative fitness benefits to recipients.
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functions that HR could not accommodate. Yet just a few
years later, Queller (1985) developed a version of HR that
handles both of these issues, and in his article, Queller
suggests that his version could apply to reciprocal altruism.
More recently, Sober and Wilson (1998) suggest a unifi-
cation of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism theories.
They show how additive versions of the prisoner’s di-
lemma (PD) correspond to fitness functions used in in-
clusive fitness models, but they do not address the two
critical issues mentioned above: genotype/phenotype dif-
ferences when behaviors are conditional and nonadditivity.
Frank (1994, 1998) notes that regression coefficients be-
tween species in his model of mutualism measure reci-
procity and are similar to coefficients of relatedness in
inclusive fitness models, but he also does not address these
two issues. The emphasis of his analysis (Frank 1998) is
on partitioning selection and transmission and on unifying
quantitative genetic and population genetic approaches.
Despite these suggestions that inclusive fitness and re-
ciprocal altruism theories are related, unification of these
two theories requires that HR be effectively applied to
reciprocal altruism. However, until now, there has been
no direct and successful demonstration of using Queller’s
more general version of HR in reciprocal altruism models.
In fact, in an expansion of his original results, Queller
(1992a, 1992b) drops any mention of its applicability to
reciprocal altruism.
Here we demonstrate that Queller’s equations do indeed
provide a foundation for the unification of inclusive fitness
and reciprocal altruism theories. Our approach differs
from Nee’s (1989) application of a version of HR to an
IPD model of reciprocal altruism. In Nee’s work, the gen-
erality of Queller’s equation was not utilized; instead,
Queller’s version was brought back to the shared genotype
level by adding an additional term that related the phe-
notype of others to their common genotype with focal
altruists. Here we use Queller’s equation in its full gen-
erality by simply taking it at face value: it is the phenotype
of others that is crucial, not their genotype. This more
encompassing viewpoint allows us to include heterospe-
cific interactions in mutualistic symbiosis, where altruists
and recipients are clearly genetically unrelated and
nonidentical.
Our models and analysis suggest that, rather than being
fundamentally different mechanisms, inclusive fitness and
reciprocal altruism are alternative ways to satisfy a com-
mon single requirement for self-sacrificing traits to in-
crease in a population. This requirement can be stated as
follows: there must be sufficient positive assortment be-
tween individuals with the altruistic genotype in question
and the helping phenotypes of others they interact with,
such that on average those with the focal genotype benefit
from the helping behaviors of others more than the costs
they incur for their own helping behaviors. The required
combination of genotype-phenotype assortment, benefit
to cost ratio, and any nonadditive effects is given by
Queller’s generalization of HR. This rule applies whether
the source of positive assortment is interactions among
relatives (the original application), conditional behaviors
among nonrelatives, or reciprocal interactions across spe-
cies (mutualistic symbiosis). This single requirement gov-
erned by Queller’s version of HR brings unity to the sep-
arate theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.
We begin by briefly reviewing HR, Queller’s contribu-
tions, and the original IPD experiments (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984). We then use Queller’s ver-
sion of HR for genotype/phenotype differences to analyze
an experiment involving an additive IPD. Using Queller’s
nonadditive version of HR, we also show how additive
behavior that is iterated within generations gives fitness
consequences similar to those of synergistic behavior
where a pairing is a single interaction per generation. (Syn-
ergy is defined below as positive nonadditivity.) Finally,
we extend this model so that there are conditional co-
operator and defector types in each of two mutualistic
species that interact. Here the particular conditional strat-
egy, benefit level provided, cost paid for cooperative be-
haviors, and any nonadditive effects can be different in
each of the species. For each species, we use Queller’s
version of HR to accurately predict whether the cooper-
ative trait will increase in that species. Finally, we discuss
the implications of these results for understanding and
unifying the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal
altruism.
The Progressive Generalization of Hamilton’s Rule
Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton 1963, 1964) gives the condition
necessary for an altruistic trait to increase in a population
in the next generation and is deceptively simple:
rb 1 c, (1)
where b is usually interpreted as the average fitness benefit
to a recipient of the altruistic behavior and c is the average
cost to an altruist for this behavior. Complications arise
in the meaning of the r term, which has been progressively
generalized over the years. Originally thought of as a sim-
ple measure of relatedness via descent (Hamilton 1963,
1964), Hamilton (after interacting with Price [1970])
broadened the meaning of r to be a measure of the as-
sortment of genetic types regardless of relatedness by de-
scent (Hamilton 1970, 1972, 1975):
Cov (G , G )A O b 1 c, (2)
Var (G )A
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Table 1: Progressive generalization of Hamilton’s rule illustrated by situations for which different versions
(eqq. [1]–[4]) apply
Equation
Kin
interactions
Nonkin genetic
similarity
Genotype-phenotype
differences ( )G( P
Nonadditive fitness
functions ( )d( 0
(1) Yes … … …
(2) Yes Yes … …
(3) Yes Yes Yes …
(4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
where GA is the genotype (or breeding value) with respect
to the altruistic trait for each potential actor (subscript A)
and GO is the average genotype value of others (subscript
O) that interact with each potential actor. Queller (1985)
further generalized Hamilton’s r term by explicitly in-
cluding the consequences of the phenotype (behaviors) of
actors and others on selection for a genetic trait rather
than focusing on the effect of genotypes directly. This
yields
Cov (G , P )A O b 1 c, (3)
Cov (G , P )A A
where PA is the phenotype of the actor and PO is the average
phenotype of others interacting with each actor. In the
appendix in the online edition of the American Naturalist,
we provide more details about the generalization of Ham-
ilton’s rule as well as the mathematical details of our mod-
els and analysis.
These covariance ratio expressions (eqq. [2], [3]) may
be convenient in comparing different versions of r, but
cross multiplying results in a more easily interpreted form
of Queller’s equation. For example, equation (3) can be
written as
Cov (G , P )b 1 Cov (G , P )c. (3a)A O A A
This says that the genotype represented by GA will increase
in the population if the covariance between its presence
in each potential actor and the helping behaviors (phe-
notypes) of others, scaled by the benefit of this help, is
more than the covariance between its presence and the
helping behaviors of actors themselves, scaled by the cost
of these behaviors. Simply put, the genotype will increase
if on average individuals carrying it receive more fitness
benefits than they pay out. Note that it is the phenotype
or behaviors of others (PO) that is critical, not their ge-
notype; there is no GO term in this equation. This has
consequences for the usual indirect fitness interpretation
of HR. As Frank (1998, p. 68) points out, “The direc-
tionality of Queller’s relatedness coefficient … is opposite
to the directionality of Hamilton’s inclusive fitness coef-
ficient.” The benefit (b) term in Queller’s version is best
interpreted as the contribution to the direct fitness of those
with the altruistic genotype from the behavior of others.
In the indirect fitness concept, b is seen as the contribution
by the actor to the fitness of others. This is a possible
interpretation of HR when these two benefits are the same,
but when the amount given and the amount received by
focal altruists differ, as in our model of symbiosis below,
only the interpretation suggested by Queller’s version
works correctly.
When there is a deviation (d) from fitness additivity for
mutual cooperation (as there is in many IPD models),
then an additional term is needed that specifies the degree
to which the focal genotype covaries with mutual coop-
eration,2 scaled by the amount of deviation (Queller 1985):
Cov (G , P )bCov (G , P P )d 1 Cov (G , P )c. (4)A O A A O A A
This deviation value can be positive (representing synergy),
negative (representing diminishing returns), or 0 (repre-
senting additivity). Note that dividing both sides of equa-
tion (4) by Cov(GA, PA) results in the same r term as in
equation (3), plus an additional covariance ratio related
to the deviation from additivity. There are other versions
of HR (for reviews, see Pepper 2000; West et al. 2002),
but equations (1)–(4) represent significant steps in a pro-
gressive generalization of HR that are summarized in table
1.
Queller’s versions (eqq. [3], [4]) apply to all situations
covered by Hamilton’s versions (eqq. [1], [2]), plus they
handle additional situations that may not allow a recursive
analysis (Grafen 1985), such as when the frequency of
cooperative behavior depends on both genotype and en-
vironmental factors (e.g., the behaviors of others). To see
that each equation above is more general than the previous
ones, note that if fitness functions are additive ( ),dp 0
then equation (4) becomes equation (3); if phenotype fre-
quencies equal genotype frequencies ( andG p PO O
), then equation (3) becomes (2); and if the sim-G p PA A
2 The product PAPO represents mutual cooperation, where cooperate (C) be-
haviors have a phenotype of 1 and defect (D) behaviors a phenotype of 0.
This is explained further in the following sections.
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Table 2: Typical prisoner’s dilemma fitness values for an
actor, given its behavior (phenotype PA) and its opponent’s
behavior (phenotype PO)
Actor’s behavior
Opponent’s behavior
C ( )P p 1O
contributes b
D ( )P p 0O
contributes 0
C ( ) sacrifices cP p 1A 3
w  b c d0
0
w  c0
D ( ) sacrifices 0P p 0A 5
w  b0
1
w0
Note: These fitness values can be represented as the result of additive
benefit contributions (b) from its partner, its own sacrifice or cost
(c), the base fitness value uncorrelated with C and D behaviors (w0),
and the deviation from additivity for mutual cooperation (d). For the
shown fitness payoff values, , , , and .bp 4 cp 1 w p 1 dp 10
ilarity in genotype between actors and others is solely due
to interactions within kin groups, then equation (2) can
become equation (1), where r represents relatedness by
descent. Queller’s version (eq. [4]) is the most general in
that it works without these restrictions or assumptions.
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Model
of Reciprocal Altruism
The PD captures a fundamental problem of social life:
individually rational behavior may lead to a collectively
irrational and deficient outcome. In n-player versions, this
dilemma is also known as a “tragedy of the commons”
(Hardin 1968) or a freeloader (free rider) problem (Mc-
Millan 1979; Avile´s 2002). Typical two-player PD fitness
values for the actor, given its own and its opponent’s be-
haviors, are shown in table 2. Here behaviors are either
cooperate (C) or defect (D). Table 2 also shows parameters
that decompose these fitness payoffs in terms of the benefit
(b) provided to an opponent by a C behavior, the cost (c)
paid by the cooperator, the base fitness (w0) that is in-
dependent of cooperation, and the deviation (d) from ad-
ditivity when cooperation is mutual. In the PD, each player
has a dominant strategy to defect (D), but if they both
cooperate, both can receive more (in this case, three in-
stead of one) than if they both defect. It is presumed that
players exhibit their behaviors simultaneously and that
there is no knowledge or guarantee about what the other
player will do. The dilemma is that cooperation makes a
player vulnerable to exploitation; in the case of mixed
behaviors, the defector gets the highest payoff (five), while
the cooperator gets the lowest (zero).
Note that while a two-player fitness matrix can be rep-
resented in terms of these four parameters, other param-
eterizations are also possible. Also note that this typical
PD matrix, which is the one used by Axelrod (1984), is
nonadditive: it cannot be achieved without a nonzero d
term. In this case, there are diminishing returns for mutual
cooperation ( ), but synergistic ( ) matricesdp 1 d 1 0
that still define a PD are also possible. While Axelrod
purposely chose a nonadditive PD to ensure that tour-
nament results did not depend on additivity (R. Axelrod,
personal communication, 2005), the nonadditive nature
of these common PD fitness values is not generally ap-
preciated. Because of nonadditivity, this PD cannot be an-
alyzed with a pre-Queller HR.
Although in a PD situation it is individually rational to
defect in each single play of the game, Axelrod and Ham-
ilton (1981) provided early support for reciprocal altruism
theory (Trivers 1971) by showing that conditional coop-
erative strategies can do well when interactions (PD games)
are iterated. The most successful strategy in Axelrod’s tour-
naments (submitted by social scientist Anatol Rapoport)
was also one of the simplest. Called “tit for tat” (TFT),
this strategy always cooperates with an opponent in the
first interaction (PD game) and, in all subsequent inter-
actions, simply plays whatever the opponent did in the
last game. This conditional behavior allowed TFT to min-
imize exploitation by defecting opponents, such as “always
defect” (ALLD), while taking advantage of mutual coop-
eration when it met other “nice” strategies. Since these
original experiments more than 25 years ago, much re-
search has been done on the IPD (Dugatkin 1997; Sachs
et al. 2004; Doebeli and Hauert 2005).
From the perspective of Queller’s version of HR (eq.
[3]), the combination of iterated games and conditional
play can create positive assortment among the helping
behaviors (phenotypes) of others and the conditionally
cooperative genotype (e.g., TFT), even when there is no
positive assortment among genotypes. That is, if one cal-
culates Hamilton’s r using only genotypes (eq. [2]), it will
be 0 in the case of random binomial pairing. Therefore,
the traditional version of HR cannot be satisfied, and it
appears as if the increase in cooperation (e.g., the increase
in TFT types) observed in IPD models of reciprocal al-
truism is not due to inclusive fitness as measured by HR.
This is not in fact the case; as we will see, Queller’s version
of HR predicts exactly when conditional cooperation will
increase in these models.
Hamilton’s Rule Applied to a Classic
Reciprocal Altruism Model
Confirming Queller’s Version
Here we offer a simple example where Queller’s version
of HR (eq. [3]) is applied to reciprocal altruism using a
population consisting of the two classic types mentioned
above, TFT and ALLD. This kind of population has been
used previously to apply a modified HR to an IPD (as
mentioned above; Nee 1989), to classify types of altruism
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Figure 1: Change in the proportion of TFT players (DQ) after one
generation as a function of benefit (b) level in a population of TFT and
ALLD players with binomial pairing. Results shown for various starting
TFT proportions (Q) and numbers of iterated games (i), where other
parameters for each game are held constant at , , andcp 1 w p 10
. Arrows indicate where . These equilibrium points aredp 0 DQp 0
predicted by Queller’s version of HR (see table A2 in the online edition
of the American Naturalist).
Table 3: Cumulative fitness values for pairings
of tit-for-tat (TFT) and always defect (ALLD)
players that last for iterated gamesip 10
Actor’s behavior
Opponent’s behavior(s)
TFT ALLD
TFT
40
′ ′ ′ ′w  b  c  d0
9
′ ′w  c0
ALLD
14
′ ′w  b0
10
′w0
Note: For each game, , , , andbp 4 cp 1 w p 10
. The shown fitness payoff values interpreted asdp 0
the result of only a single interaction can be decomposed
with , , , and . This game′ ′ ′ ′b p 4 c p 1 w p 10 d p 270
is not a prisoner’s dilemma; in the game theory litera-
ture, it is called “assurance” or “stag hunt.”
(Kerr and Godfrey-Smith 2002), and to study the evolution
of altruism in finite populations (Nowak et al. 2004). Be-
cause one of the types (TFT) uses conditional behaviors,
we must measure genotype and phenotype frequencies
separately. To calculate the covariances needed in equation
(3), we take TFT as our focal genotype (G) and assign it
a value of 1 and ALLD a value of 0. For phenotype (P),
the cooperate (C) behavior has a value of 1, and the defect
(D) behavior a value of 0. In a population of these two
types, there will be three possible parings (TFT-TFT, TFT-
ALLD, ALLD-ALLD), each with predictable values for GA,
PO, and PA, given the number of iterated games (i) within
generations (table A1 in the online edition of the American
Naturalist).3 Again, subscript A indicates the focal actor,
and subscript O means others (in this case, the focal actor’s
opponent). We can now calculate the change in TFT fre-
quency in the population (DQ), assuming fitness payoffs
are proportional to offspring representation. Given the
population averages for the frequency of C behaviors and
the initial frequency of TFT types (Q), we can also calculate
whether Queller’s version of HR is satisfied for any given
parameter settings (see appendix).
We begin with an additive PD game ( ). Figure 1dp 0
shows the change in the proportion of the TFT type (DQ)
after one generation of random pairing and asexual re-
3 For mathematical convenience, i represents a fixed number of games in
each interaction. Similar results hold for games of average length i, and the
simple players in this model are not capable of using knowledge of the number
of games for backward induction.
production as a function of the benefit value (b) for dif-
ferent values of the initial TFT frequency (Q) and number
of iterations (i). For convenience, other parameters are
held constant at and . Notice that, all elsecp 1 w p 10
being equal, more iterations or higher starting Q make it
easier for DQ to increase. Arrows in figure 1 indicate the
predicted equilibrium points ( ) using Queller’sDQp 0
(eq. [3]) version of HR and the same parameters used in
figure 1 (appendix). If instead of equation (3), which in-
volves PO, we use the more restricted equation (2), which
involves GO, for this binomial population structure,rp 0
and we do not correctly predict the increase in the pro-
portion of TFT (Q). In contrast, Queller’s version exactly
predicts these “tipping points,” that is, the value of benefit,
b, beyond which TFT increases in each population.
Iterations and Synergy
Queller’s version of HR (eq. [4]) suggests two ways to
enhance the evolution of cooperation, given random
grouping: if cooperative behaviors toward altruists are
more frequent than the frequency with which they are
grouped with other altruists or if there is nonadditive syn-
ergy for mutual cooperation. Here we show that these two
effects can have equivalent fitness consequences. Coop-
eration evolves in the populations plotted in figure 1 be-
cause conditional behavior positively assorts cooperation
with TFT genotypes, but an alternative analysis is possible.
Assuming additive PD parameter values of ,bp 4 cp
, , and and iterations of , the cu-1 w p 1 dp 0 ip 100
mulative intergenerational fitness consequences of differ-
ent pairings are shown in table 3 as if they were the result
of a single interaction between the players. This resulting
game matrix, no longer a PD, can be decomposed into
our four parameters. We use primes to distinguish param-
eters of the resulting game from those of the original. The
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Figure 2: Fitness relationships between two interacting species (1 and
2). The origin of each arrow corresponds to a cooperate behavior (C)
by the species at its origin, and the termination of each arrow indicates
which species’ fitness is directly affected by this behavior. For instance,
a C behavior exhibited by a member of species 1 has two definite effects—
decrement of c1 in its own fitness and an increment of b1 to its species
2 partner’s fitness—as well as one potential “interaction” effect (indicted
by dashed lines), a change of d1 in its own fitness only if there is also a
simultaneous C behavior by its species 2 partner. We label benefits by
their source to emphasize that help is given heterospecifically.
parameters for table 3 are , , ,′ ′ ′b p 4 c p 1 w p 100
(appendix).′d p 27
Now suppose that we do not know the fitness conse-
quences of each social interaction (game) or how often
interactions (iterations) occur within each generation. In-
stead, we see only who is paired with whom and the re-
sulting fitness consequences to each type at the end of
each generation. The fitness consequences are the same as
in the original situation, but from this “black box” per-
spective, there are no iterations and no difference in ge-
notype versus phenotype frequencies. There are just bi-
nomial single-interaction ( ) pairings but a strongip 1
fitness synergy when TFT meets TFT. Analyzing this syn-
ergistic ( ) situation with equation (4) and no ge-′d p 27
notype/phenotype differences gives the exact same in-
equality as assuming additivity ( ) and genotype/dp 0
phenotype differences due to iterations ( ) andip 10
conditional play (appendix). This perspective provides an
alternative explanation for how conditional strategies such
as TFT evolve. From this point of view, it is not so much
that iterations and conditional play “solve” the PD itself
(in which defection is favored) but that they effectively
change the game into one in which mutual cooperation
(in table 3 labeled TFT) has the highest fitness payoff.
Note, however, that the “assurance” game that the PD has
been converted into is not itself dilemma free: ALLD still
receives more than TFT in all heterogeneous pairings (table
3), and therefore a maximin strategy results in a Nash
equilibrium of mutual defection, which is Pareto
nonoptimal.
Hamilton’s Rule Applied to Cooperation across Species
Mutualism Model
Here we use Queller’s version of HR to analyze a simple
model of mutualistic symbiosis in which there are two
interacting species (labeled 1 and 2), each with two dif-
ferent types: ALLD and (usually) a conditional cooperator
type such as TFT. For convenience, the cooperative be-
haviors of interest take place only heterospecifically. For
instance, the behaviors between cleaner fish and their hosts
(Bshary and Grutter 2002) are strictly heterospecific:
cleaner fish do not clean conspecifics, and hosts are not
cleaned by other hosts. We also assume random (binomial)
pairings, but conditional behavior will provide the asym-
metry in benefits within species necessary for mutualists
to increase (Ferriere et al. 2001). Note that these inter-
actions, unlike our within-species cooperation examples
above, can be asymmetric between species in terms of
costs, benefits, and deviation from additivity (Frank 1994;
Sachs et al. 2004). Figure 2 illustrates these fitness param-
eters between the two species. The benefit and cost for
species 1 exhibiting a C behavior are b1 (benefit to species
2) and c1 (its own cost) and similarly for species 2. We
label the benefits by their source to highlight the fact that
the benefit received by a member of one species comes
from a completely unrelated member of the other species.
Nonadditive effects, which have their source in both spe-
cies, are subscripted with the species whose fitness is di-
rectly affected. The proportion of the cooperative type in
each species is given by Q1 and Q2, respectively. In general,
whether the focal genotype (e.g., TFT) of species 1 in-
creases in the next generation is predicted by Queller’s
version of HR (eq. [4]), where A (actor) is a member of
species 1 and O (other) is a member of species 2:
Cov (G , P )b Cov (G , PP )d 1 Cov (G , P)c . (5)1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
A symmetric equation (where all subscripts are switched)
predicts whether the focal type in species 2 increases or
not. We will refer to these two instances of Hamilton’s
rule as HR1 and HR2, respectively (appendix).
This model of symbiosis has some similarities to one
developed by Frank (1994), but his model assumes that
phenotype and genotype frequencies are the same and that
fitness functions are additive. While this simple model does
not capture all types of mutualisms (Bronstein 2001), as
far as we know, the analysis presented here is the first
example of the use of Queller’s version of HR to analyze
cooperation across species in which behavior can be con-
ditional ( ).G( P
Dynamic Simulations
Figure 3 illustrates the coupled dynamics in our model,
where cooperation can reach saturation in both species
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Figure 3: Dynamics between two species, each with a cooperative type and an ALLD type for various parameter settings. A, Cooperation evolves
even though in species 1 cooperation costs more than the benefit it produces. Parameters are , , , , initial ,ip 4 b p 1.5 c p 2 d p 0 Q p 0.21 1 1 1
, , , and initial ; in both species, the cooperative type is TFT and . B, All parameters are the same for bothb p 5 c p 0.1 d p 0 Q p 0.1 w p 22 2 2 2 0
species, except that the cooperative type in species 1 is TF2T and in species 2 is Pavlov. Parameters are , , ,ip 80 b p b p 4 c p c p 1 d p1 2 1 2 1
, initial , and . C, Cooperative type is unconditional (ALLC) in species 1 and TFT in species 2. Other parameters ared p 0 Q p Q p 0.1 w p 12 1 2 0
, , , , initial , , , , initial , and in both species . The bars above eachip 100 b p 2 c p 1 d p 0 Q p 0.01 b p 2.2 c p 0.1 d p 1.3 Q p 0.5 w p 11 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0
graph indicate at which generations Queller’s version of HR (e.g., eq. [5]) is satisfied (solid bar) for each species respectively (HR1 and HR2). Note
that satisfying HR corresponds to when the cooperative type in each species increases.
even under some surprising conditions. In figure 3A, mu-
tual symbiotic cooperation evolves even though cooper-
ation costs members of species 1 more than the benefit
they provide ( ). This inefficient form of altruism isc 1 b1 1
not generally thought to evolve, but it can evolve here
because of the high benefits of cooperation provided by
the other species; that is, b2 is sufficiently greater than c1
(eq. [5]). In this case, fitness is additive, . Ind p d p 01 2
these dynamic numerical simulations, HR1 and HR2 are
calculated each generation, and horizontal bars above each
graph in figure 3 indicate when these respective inequalities
are satisfied in each species. In all cases, Queller’s version
of HR accurately predicts when the cooperative type will
increase. For instance, at the start of the run depicted in
figure 3A, HR1 (eq. [5]) is not satisfied and the TFT type
decreases in species 1, but because the fraction of the TFT
type in species 2 (Q2) is simultaneously increasing, Q1 is
eventually pulled up in this coupled system.
Note that if the benefit provided by cooperative behav-
iors in species 1 (b1) is used in equation (5) instead of b2
for comparison with c1, HR1 does not accurately predict
the fate of TFT in this species. To work, the b term must
be the benefit received, not the benefit provided, by car-
riers of the focal genotype (e.g., TFT). The criterion for
an increase in altruism is not that the benefit given by
altruists sufficiently exceed their costs but rather that, on
average, the benefit received by those with the altruistic
genotype exceed their costs.
In the run shown in figure 3B, all parameters are the
same for both species and additive, but the cooperative
strategies differ: in species 1, it is tit for two tats (TF2T),
which plays C unless the previous two plays by its op-
ponent were both D, and in species 2, it is Pavlov (Nowak
and Sigmund 1993), which initially cooperates but
switches its behavior if it did not get one of the two highest
payoffs in the last game. The terms Q1 and Q2 give the
fraction of the more cooperative type in each species, re-
spectively. Initially, when both species are dominated by
ALLD types ( ), Pavlov looses ground inQ p Q p 0.11 2
species 2 as it alternates C and D behaviors when paired
with the ALLD type in species 1; it never gets one of the
two highest payoffs and therefore keeps switching. The
TF2T type in species 1 fares better because it cooperates
only in the first two games when it meets an ALLD. Even-
tually, the fact that the TF2T type in species 1 increases
provides more opportunities for the Pavlov type in species
2 to end up in a mutually cooperative interaction, and it
too eventually increases.
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Finally, in figure 3C, the cooperative type in species 1
is unconditional always cooperate (ALLC) and in species
2 is TFT. In this case, even having conditional behaviors
in only one species can be enough for cooperation to
evolve in both. Here species 1 faces a PD in each inter-
action, experiences no synergy for mutual cooperation
( ), and starts with only 1% of its population beingd p 01
the ALLC type ( ). We would expect this naiveQ p 0.011
cooperator to be selected out of species 1 under random
pairing, but instead it steadily increases to saturation. Here
species 2 starts with an even mixture of TFT and ALLD
types and experiences synergy for mutual cooperation
( ).d p 1.32
Of course, many other parameter settings are possible,
including where cooperation goes extinct. Here we just
illustrate that conditional behavior with iterations and/or
nonadditivity can allow a cooperative symbiotic relation-
ship to evolve under random grouping even if one species
is inefficient ( ) in its help (fig. 3A), less effective inc 1 b
avoiding exploitation by ALLD (fig. 3B), or even uncon-
ditionally cooperative (fig. 3C). Our different strategy types
are not meant to represent any particular symbiosis ex-
amples in nature but to show that the evolution of mu-
tualisms needs not depend on particular strategies and that
strategies can vary between mutualistic partners. Note that
in this simple model with its obligatory heterospecific in-
teractions, the fates of the cooperative types in each species
are ultimately tied together, and the system reaches an
equilibrium of either all cooperation ( ) orQ p Q p 1.01 2
all defection ( ). At each generation alongQ p Q p 0.01 2
the way, Queller’s version of HR accurately predicts the
direction of selection for the (conditionally) cooperative
type in each species.
Discussion
A recent review article (Sachs et al. 2004), with the same
title as Axelrod and Hamilton’s (1981) seminal article and
Axelrod’s (1984) book, echoes the traditional view that
inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism are fundamentally
distinct explanations for the evolution of altruism. For
instance, these authors state that these theories differ be-
cause reciprocal altruism can operate “between nonrela-
tives and between species” (Sachs et al. 2004, p. 139) and
that inclusive fitness is unique because “the cooperative
individual need not benefit from its act” (Sachs et al. 2004,
p. 143).
In this article, we demonstrate that, on the contrary, the
distinction between inclusive fitness and reciprocal altru-
ism is not sharp. We show that Hamilton’s inclusive fitness
rule (in Queller’s generalized form) applies to reciprocal
altruism. Analysis of Hamilton’s rule also reveals that the
evolution of altruism by inclusive fitness involves reci-
procity (even if nonconditional): on average, carriers of
the altruistic genotype must receive direct benefits. While
this reciprocated benefit can be asymmetric, on average,
it must sufficiently exceed focal carriers’ costs, where the
meaning of “sufficiently” is captured by Queller’s version
of HR. Inclusive fitness is also broadened beyond the no-
tion of genes helping other copies of themselves in recip-
ients (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976). This “selfish gene”
interpretation of HR holds only in the special case where
helping behaviors are predicted by the common alleles
between donor and recipients. A broader notion of inclu-
sive fitness, as Queller (1985) argued for, is fitness aug-
mented by help from others regardless of their genotype.
There are two important and related ideas here that are
reflected in the most general form of HR (eq. [4]; table
1), which can encompass not only kin selection but also
reciprocal altruism and symbiosis. For its most general
application, first, the direct cost of behaving altruistically
should be compared with the direct benefit gain to carriers
of the altruistic genotype from others (rather than to an
indirect benefit via the enhanced fitness of other carriers),
and second, the direct fitness benefit depends on the be-
haviors (phenotypes) of others, not their genotypes. The
first point is plainly evident in our symbiosis results, which
show that, in the general case where benefit provided dif-
fers from benefit received, only an interpretation of HR
based on direct benefit received by carriers gives a correct
result. Rather than employing multiple interpretations of
HR—one for relatives, one for nonrelatives having com-
mon alleles, and one for different alleles (including in
different species)—it is more parsimonious for a theory
of altruism to be based simply on the most general in-
terpretation of HR. From this perspective, the equation
(1) version (for relatives) of HR is just a special case of
the equation (2) version, which does not depend on re-
latedness by descent, and the genotype of others (GO) in
the equation (2) version is just a stand-in for the phe-
notype of others (PO) in the most general form of the rule,
that is, Queller’s equations (3) and (4). It is also more
parsimonious to see HR as measuring whether the fitness
gains to carriers are sufficiently greater than their costs
rather than in terms of indirect fitness.
Note that explaining how, on average, benefits to car-
riers of the altruistic genotype end up exceeding their costs
does not affect the definition of altruism at the individual
level (Kerr et al. 2004). The conventional perspective in
which an individual altruist incurs cost and gives benefit
remains essential to defining altruism. Given that individ-
uals have no guarantees about their partner’s present and
future behaviors, cooperation (C) in any given PD inter-
action (game) is altruistic because, compared with the al-
ternative behavior (D), a cooperator gives benefit to others
at a cost to itself. Even summing over iterations, TFT can
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be seen as altruistic from a relative fitness perspective (Wil-
son 2004) in that TFT never does better than its paired
opponent (Rapoport 1991; Sober and Wilson 1998) and
its opponent does better than if it had been paired with
ALLD. The fact that pairs of TFT do better than pairs of
ALLD for particular parameters helps explain how altru-
ism evolves overall, and this is captured in Queller’s ver-
sion of HR and in the multilevel selection framework
where groups are of size 2 (Sober and Wilson 1998).
We have intentionally used simple models of reciprocal
altruism in order to illustrate our point about unification,
but Queller’s version of HR can be applied to a much
broader array of circumstances. This includes values of b,
c, and d that fall outside the definition of a PD, group
sizes greater than two, diploid genetics, other population
structures besides binomial random grouping, degrees of
cooperation rather than just all C or D, and other forms
of conditional behavior beyond those based on just the
past behavior of others.
The Role of Synergy
Models of the evolution of altruism typically assume var-
ious combinations of random interactions, additive fitness
functions, and a one-to-one correspondence between ge-
notype and phenotype frequencies. Dropping one or more
of these assumptions can make the evolution of cooper-
ation more likely. Traditional inclusive fitness models focus
on nonrandom interactions due to kinship while leaving
the other assumptions in place. Traditional reciprocal al-
truism models assume random encounters but use con-
ditional behavior to break the correspondence between
genotype and phenotype.
What has been less explored but is explicitly addressed
by Queller’s version of HR (eq. [4]) is the role of non-
additive synergy, something quite different from the po-
tentially additive benefit of mutual cooperation (see
Hauert et al. 2006). Its significance will of course depend
on fitness consequences in particular interactions. In the
accompanying commentary on Queller’s (1985) original
article, Grafen (1985, p. 311) argued that “for genes of
small effect, additivity is restored and the correctness of
Hamilton’s rule is restored with it.” While HR in its ad-
ditive form may be a good approximation when fitness
effects are small, cooperative traits may have strong syn-
ergistic effects. From cooperative hunters that bring home
spoils greater than they could get alone (Packer and Ruttan
1988), to cooperatively swimming sperm that reach the
egg faster than individual swimmers (Moore et al. 2002),
to the potential synergistic benefits of mutualisms (Herre
et al. 1999; Bronstein 2001; Ferriere et al. 2001), the natural
world is full of potentially superadditive situations (Wright
2000; Michod and Nedelcu 2003).
At the same time, cooperative interaction may create
new opportunities for defection (Michod and Nedelcu
2003), for example, the free-riding hunter or swimming
sperm that expends less energy than average but still reaps
the benefit of others’ cooperation. The relationship be-
tween synergy and exploitation by defectors is difficult to
appreciate in the paired interactions modeled here. This
is because when there is one C behavior, there is no syn-
ergy, and when there are two C behaviors, there are no
defectors to do the exploiting. More generally, where syn-
ergistic benefits are an increasing function of the propor-
tion of cooperators in a group (and benefits are shared
among all group members), there are necessarily more
cooperators in situations with the highest synergistic pay-
offs, while defectors are at a relative advantage within each
group because they do not pay the cost.
Synergy may also be important in addressing recent
arguments that reciprocal altruism rarely occurs in nature
(Hammerstein 2003). Some of these assessments are based
on the low frequency of repeated interactions, but as we
have shown, fewer iterations are required in the presence
of nonadditive synergy. Elsewhere, we showed that mul-
tiple generations within groups similarly result in non-
additivity (Fletcher and Zwick 2004). Though not explored
here, nonadditivity may also be negative, as in the typical
PD (table 2) or other cases of diminishing returns (Foster
2004; Hauert et al. 2006).
A General Theory with Many Specific Mechanisms
In a review on the evolution of mutualism, Herre et al.
(1999, p. 52) lament that “there is no general theory of
mutualism that approaches the explanatory power that
‘Hamilton’s rule’ appears to hold for the understanding
of within-species interactions.” In this article, we have
shown that in fact HR itself, in Queller’s generalized form,
provides a general theoretical basis for understanding the
evolution of cooperation across species. Fundamentally,
the evolution of altruism (within or between species) de-
pends on sufficient positive assortment between individ-
uals with the altruistic genotype of interest and the helping
behaviors (i.e., phenotypes) of others and/or sufficient syn-
ergistic effects of mutual cooperation (eq. [4]).
Sufficient association between cooperators and coop-
eration from others or synergistic effects can be created
in a variety of ways. These include interactions in spatially
structured populations among kin (Hamilton 1964) or
across species (Doebeli and Knowlton 1998), iterated and
conditional behavior based on the past behaviors (Trivers
1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984; Dugatkin
1997) or reputations (Nowak and Sigmund 1998, 2005;
Panchanathan and Boyd 2003) of others, policing (Frank
1995, 2003), punishment of nonaltruists (Boyd and Rich-
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erson 1992; Fehr and Ga¨chter 2002; Boyd et al. 2003), the
constraint of social norms (Bowles et al. 2003), foraging
in nonlinearly renewed heterogeneous resource distribu-
tions (Pepper and Smuts 2002), periodic environmental
disturbances (Mitteldorf and Wilson 2000), the presence
of fixed (Hauert et al. 2002) or conditional (Aktipis 2004)
nonparticipants, the coevolution of group joining and syn-
ergistic cooperative behaviors (Avile´s et al. 2004), multi-
generational groups (Fletcher and Zwick 2004), and even
recognition and coevolution of arbitrary tags (Riolo et al.
2001; Axelrod et al. 2004). And of course more than one
of these less proximate mechanisms can be operating
simultaneously.
Summary
In summary, we have argued for a common mechanism
by which altruism evolves that is fundamental to both
inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism theories. To sup-
port the unification of these two theories, we have dem-
onstrated how a more general form of Hamilton’s inclusive
fitness rule developed by Queller (1985) can be used to
analyze a classic model of reciprocal altruism. In addition,
we have shown how Queller’s version of HR accurately
predicts the evolution of cooperation between two differ-
ent species in a simple model of symbiosis. This highlights
the fact that kinship, genetic similarity, or common species
identity between donors and recipients is not fundamental
to the workings of Hamilton’s rule. What this rule requires
is that those carrying the altruistic genotype receive direct
benefits from the phenotype (behaviors) of others (ad-
justed by any nonadditive effects) that on average exceed
the direct costs of their own behaviors. Kinship interac-
tions or conditional iterated behaviors are merely two of
many possible ways of satisfying this fundamental con-
dition for altruism to evolve.
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